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The Federal Question in Patent-License Cases 
AMELIA SMITH RINEHART* 
The patent law has long recognized a patent owner’s ability to license some 
interest in the patent by granting to others permission to tread upon the patent 
owner’s property rights without legal consequence. When one of the parties to a 
patent license decides to seek remedies from the other party for a license harm, the 
resulting litigation may be a patent-infringement case with a contract issue or a 
contract case with a patent issue. In most cases, the patent owner brings her suit 
against the licensee in federal court, alleging that the licensee breached the license 
contract and, as a result, now infringes the patent. However, a patent owner, as the 
master of her suit, may choose to bring it in state court and raise only a contract 
claim governed by state law. The license agreement, by its very nature, implicates 
patent issues, but it is not always clear when a state suit like this one may be removed 
to federal court. This is especially true after a recent Supreme Court case, Gunn v. 
Minton, and amendments to the relevant jurisdictional statutes as part of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011. 
The jurisdictional rules governing these types of cases are convoluted, clunky, 
and heavily criticized. In this Article, I argue that the current jurisdictional rules are 
unnecessary and burdensome in patent-license cases, and I propose a new rule that 
would place patent-license cases—even those that would be considered state 
contract cases under the existing framework—in federal courts with exclusive 
appeals to the Federal Circuit. Ultimately, the reduced burden on litigants and 
courts, the increased clarity of the law, and the structural advantages for the Federal 
Circuit as it continues to develop an important body of licensing law outweigh any 
federalism costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a patent license, a patent owner grants to someone else permission to tread upon 
the patent owner’s property rights without legal consequence.1 Although these 
licenses seem like ordinary contracts, hidden behind the basic agreement granting 
permission to make, use, sell, or otherwise practice the patented invention lurks a 
murky gumbo of contract, property, antitrust, and patent laws and policies. Because 
licenses have important economic consequences for licensors, licensees, and the 
general public,2 they often end up the center of patent disputes. In fact, since 2007, 
the Supreme Court has heard five cases in which a patent license was essential to the 
Court’s resolution of the dispute.3 This is not surprising—patent licensing has long 
been considered “a critical transaction model in the information economy.”4 
A patent-license dispute may involve a little (or a lot) of state contract law and 
federal patent law. Federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases 
that arise under the laws relating to patents.5 Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases that 
arise under the patent laws.6 Therefore, when courts are asked to determine whether a 
patent-license case belongs in federal court on patent-law grounds, choosing the right 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Potter v. Holland, 19 F. Cas. 1154, 1157 (C.C.D. Conn. 1858) (No. 11,329) (“A 
licensee is one who has transferred to him, in writing or orally, a less or different interest than 
either the interest in the whole patent, or an undivided part of such whole interest, or an 
exclusive sectional interest.”); see also 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 760 (1890) (“The conveyance of the subordinate rights in the invention, 
either separately or united, without affecting the monopoly otherwise than by estoppel, is also 
permitted; and the interests thus created are fully vindicated and sustained. To this conveyance 
custom and judicial sanction have attached the name of License.”). The precursor for the U.S. 
patent laws, the 1474 Venetian Act, also recognizes licenses in its text. Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and Influence, 
84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 204 (2009) (citing Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948)). 
 2. XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND PRACTICE 14–39 
(2006) (describing the value of licensing as its ability to enable innovation); see also Robert P. 
Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005). 
 3. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 
U.S. 617 (2008); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 4. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 1, at 203. As Richard Epstein writes, “These multiple 
transactions help wring the last unit of value out of the underlying [intellectual property] 
asset.” Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal 
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 498 (2010). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). For one proposal that this statute should not provide for 
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 
WIS. L. REV. 11. 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). The previous versions of § 1295 tied the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to cases that arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. See infra Part I.B 
for further discussion of the relevance of this amendment. 
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answer implicates not just the choice between state and federal courts but also the 
choice between a regional appeal and a specialized-court appeal.7 
Two recent Supreme Court cases, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.8 and 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC,9 involved disputes over whether 
patent-license cases belong in federal court at all. In these cases and others, complex 
questions of federal patent jurisdiction—what one scholar referred to as “one of the 
darkest corridors of the law of federal courts and federal jurisdiction”10—complicate 
what may be a relatively simple inquiry on the merits. This Article suggests that this 
dark corridor instead should be an easy, well-lighted path, best positioning the 
Federal Circuit to develop a robust body of licensing law. 
A case arises under the laws relating to patents when either (1) the plaintiff’s 
well-pleaded complaint includes a patent-law cause of action or (2) the plaintiff’s 
well-pleaded complaint includes a nonpatent cause of action that raises a necessary, 
disputed, and substantial patent question whose resolution in federal court would not 
disrupt the proper federal-state balance.11 The first category of cases includes claims 
for patent infringement and for correction of inventorship of an issued patent, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. This choice has been particularly salient in recent years, as the Federal Circuit and its 
jurisprudence have come under a sustained attack from the Supreme Court, the legal academy, 
practitioners, and even other appellate judges. The Supreme Court has rejected several Federal 
Circuit patent-law doctrines in recent years, including its machine-or-transformation test as 
the sole test for determining patent-eligible business methods, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2010); its “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for determining Article III standing in 
declaratory judgment actions, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118; its “teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation” test to combine requirements for nonobviousness, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 (2007); and its presumption of irreparable harm for patent-infringement winners, 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). For criticism from patent scholars, 
see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1578 (2003) (stating that in some technology fields the Federal Circuit fails to realize that its 
patent-law policy is “precisely backwards”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a 
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1797 (2013) (providing an account of the 
Federal Circuit’s “power enhancement”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2007). The Honorable 
Diane Wood, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, recently advocated 
abolishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, suggesting instead that giving 
parties a choice between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuit in which their claim was 
first filed is a way to address the “blurred lines” that occur between patent law and the other 
types of intellectual property law handled by regional circuits. Diane P. Wood, Keynote 
Address, Is It Time To Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 
13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 6 (citing ROBIN THICKE, Blurred Lines, on BLURRED LINES 
(Star Trak / Interscope 2013)). 
 8. 549 U.S. 118. 
 9. 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
 10. Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal 
Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 639, 662–64 (1971) (assessing the 
jurisdictional effects of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)); see also Arthur Young 
& Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 11. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013). This test for federal patent 
jurisdiction parallels that of the general federal-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1988). 
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only patent causes of action.12 The second category of cases, which the Supreme Court 
has called “a special and small category,”13 comprises federal causes of action that are 
not specific to patents (e.g., antitrust claims)14 or state causes of action (e.g., contract 
claims).15 To further confuse matters, a patent question raised as a defense to the 
plaintiff’s cause of action, or one raised in anticipation of a defense to the plaintiff’s 
cause of action, cannot support federal patent jurisdiction.16 This prohibition makes 
declaratory-judgment cases like the ones often brought by patent licensees against 
patent owners (including MedImmune and Medtronic) even more complex, 
jurisdiction-wise. As the Supreme Court developed these complex jurisdictional rules 
in both patent and general federal-question cases, it emphasized how special and small 
the second category of federal cases is. For example, the Court refused federal patent 
jurisdiction over a patent legal-malpractice case in Gunn v. Minton.17 
Alongside this line of precedent, the Supreme Court also has been promoting 
federal patent policy over state-law interests, effectively broadening jurisdiction to 
accommodate licensee challenges, which it deems important to a strong public 
interest in policing bad patents.18 Congress, too, has stepped into the fray, amending 
the jurisdictional statutes in 2011.19 As a result, lower courts struggle to define the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”); 35 U.S.C. § 256(b) (2012) (“[A] court . . . may order correction 
of the [inventorship of the] patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned . . . .”). Courts 
accept § 281 as creating a cause of action. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 
1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit has construed § 256 to “provide[] a cause of 
action to interested parties to have the inventorship of a patent changed to reflect the true 
inventors of the subject matter claimed in the patent.” Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 
F.3d 1466, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 13. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 
547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)). 
 14. See, e.g., Christianson, 486 U.S. at 805 (antitrust). 
 15. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1282–85 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying the second path to federal patent jurisdiction and holding the 
contract claim did not require resolution of a patent-law question), appeal transferred, 410 F. 
App’x 151 (10th Cir. 2011); see also U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (holding that breach-of-contract claim arose under the patent laws because the claim 
required a court to interpret the patents and determine whether the accused product infringed 
those patents). 
 16. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809. 
 17. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066–68.  
 18. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (“[E]nforcing this contractual 
provision would undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in 
the public domain.”); see also Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 
1943) (“We have disposed of the patent as a whole because it has seemed to us proper that it 
should not remain in the art as a scarecrow.”). 
 19. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), expanded the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction to include compulsory counterclaims like the ones raised and rejected by 
the Supreme Court in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 
(2002). See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Federal 
Circuit over an appeal from a final decision “in any civil action arising under, or in any civil 
action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of 
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outer boundaries of jurisdiction over cases involving a patent license that implicates 
both patent-law and contract-law questions.20 The resulting jurisdictional map, 
complete with state-federal border disputes, gives rise to too much spilled ink from 
courts and expended resources by parties, even if the parties concede jurisdiction one 
way or another.21 
In this Article, I argue that the current jurisdictional rules are unnecessary and 
burdensome in patent-license cases, and I propose a new rule placing patent-license 
cases—even those that under the existing framework would be considered state 
contract cases—in federal courts with exclusive appeals to the Federal Circuit. Part 
I explains the current law of statutory jurisdiction in patent-license cases, including 
declaratory-judgment cases brought by parties other than the patent owner. Part II 
appraises the current jurisdictional rules as inefficient for both litigants and courts. 
Part III makes the case for a clear, bright-line rule, treating patent-license cases as 
special, mixed-law cases worthy of streamlined and uniform treatment. In this Part, 
I illustrate the impact of the new rule and consider the potential disadvantages of 
such a rule, including objections grounded in federalism concerns. Ultimately, the 
reduced burden on litigants and courts, the increased clarity of law, and the structural 
advantages of the Federal Circuit to develop an important body of licensing law 
outweigh any federalism costs. Finally, the Article concludes with some thoughts on 
the impact and importance of federal patent jurisdiction. 
I. CASES ARISING UNDER LAWS RELATING TO PATENTS 
In addition to constitutional justiciability governed by the Article III “cases and 
controversies” requirement,22 federal cases must satisfy a statutory requirement: 
specifically, Congress must have conferred subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
dispute.23 In patent cases, the statutory grant of jurisdiction comes from 28 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Congress relating to patents”). The legislation also added a removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1454 
(2012), for patent, plant-variety protection, and copyright cases. See AIA § 19(c)(1). 
 20. See, e.g., Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 775 (Ct. App. 
2004) (acknowledging “the difficulties inherent in deciding such questions”). 
 21. “Subject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even 
where, as here, neither party has raised this issue.” Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Textile Prods., Inc., v. Mead Corp., 
134 F.3d 1481, 1485–86 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special 
obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in 
a cause under review,’ even though the parties are prepared to concede it.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986))). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 23. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 277–83 (6th ed. 2012). The 
two most common statutory grants of jurisdiction are diversity jurisdiction, where Congress 
allows cases involving diverse parties to be adjudicated in federal courts regardless of the 
nature of the claims at issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), and federal-question jurisdiction, 
where Congress allows cases involving certain claims to be adjudicated in federal courts, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). The existence of federal jurisdiction is not controversial. However, 
rationales for its existence, such as lack of parity in state courts or the need for uniformity in 
the interpretation of the law, have been disputed. See CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 5.2.1, at 283–
84. With regard to parity, see Erwin Chemerinksy, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for 
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§ 1338(a), which follows closely the general federal-question jurisdiction grant in 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.24 Part I.A describes how courts determine federal patent jurisdiction 
under § 1338(a). Part I.B explains the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent cases. Finally, Part I.C briefly discusses how state license 
actions may be removed to federal court as federal patent cases. 
A. Federal Patent Jurisdiction 
The patent-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), provides for original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents.” 25 In 2011, Congress added, for emphasis, “No State court shall 
have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating 
to patents.”26 Courts interpreting § 1338 utilize the wealth of jurisprudence 
interpreting the general federal-question statute, which also uses “arising under” to 
define its grant of federal jurisdiction to certain cases, because the two statutes have 
long been linked in interpretation through “linguistic consistency.”27 
In patent cases, as in general ones, the Supreme Court recognizes two ways that a 
case arises under federal law.28 The more direct way is “when federal law creates the 
                                                                                                                 
 
the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988). With regard to uniformity, see John F. 
Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
247 (2007) (arguing that there is reason to doubt that uniformity of federal law will be 
undermined by permitting state courts to adjudicate federal claims). 
 24. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (“Our cases 
interpreting identical language in other jurisdictional provisions, particularly the general 
federal-question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . have quite naturally applied the same test.”). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). An early patent law, the Patent Act of 1793, granted 
jurisdiction to infringement suits brought “in the circuit court of the United States, or any other 
court having competent jurisdiction.” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 
(repealed 1836). The Patent Act of 1836 provided that all actions arising under the patent laws 
shall be originally cognizable in the circuit courts. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 
117, 124 (amended 1870). In 1870, Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts 
over cases arising under the patent laws. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 55–58, 16 Stat. 198, 
206–07; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 256, 36 Stat. 1087, 1160; 28 U.S.C. § 371 
(1925–26); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (Supp. II 1948); Note, The Jurisdiction of State Courts over 
Cases Involving Patents, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 461 n.1 (1931). 
 26. AIA, Pub. L. No. 212-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) 
(2012)). The Supreme Court recently stated, “For cases falling within the patent-specific arising 
under jurisdiction of § 1338(a), however, Congress has not only provided for federal jurisdiction 
but also eliminated state jurisdiction.” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013). 
 27. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09. It is not enough to anticipate a patent-law defense 
in the complaint. Id. at 809. Rather, patent law must create the cause of action or comprise a 
necessary element of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 808–09; see also Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066–
68; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (finding no Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction based on § 1338(a) when the 
underlying case was brought under the diversity statute), appeal transferred, 410 F. App’x 
151 (10th Cir. 2011); infra Part III (suggesting that § 1338(a) be uncoupled from the 
interpretation and legacy of § 1331). 
 28. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064–65; Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g 
& Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005). 
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cause of action asserted.”29 This category of cases “accounts for the vast bulk of suits 
that arise under federal law”30 and captured courts’ first understanding of the 
jurisdictional statute now known as § 1338(a). 
In cases brought in the early twentieth century, when the patent owner sued an 
alleged infringer for patent infringement and requested relief in the form of an 
injunction or damages, the case arose under the patent laws even if the plaintiff and 
the defendant were in a contractual relationship.31 In other words, if the patent owner 
licensed the patent, he still could sue the licensee for patent infringement even though 
the contract dictated what the licensee had permission to do.32 However, as the Court 
noted in Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 
[W]here a patentee complainant makes his suit one for recovery of 
royalties under a contract of license or assignment, or for damages for a 
breach of its covenants, or for a specific performance thereof, or asks the 
aid of the Court in declaring a forfeiture of the license or in restoring an 
unclouded title to the patent, he does not give the federal district court 
jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under the patent laws.33 
The exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over patents as provided by § 1338 
required courts to distinguish those cases that arise under the patent laws from those 
cases “in which a patent may be the subject-matter of the controversy.”34 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (citing Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 
U.S. 257, 260 (1916)). 
 30. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)). 
 31. See, e.g., Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 260 (1897). 
 32. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135–36 (2007). Of course, 
the license may be raised as a defense to the action, which goes to the merits, not the 
jurisdiction, of the case. Id. 
 33. 270 U.S. 496, 510 (1926). In Luckett, the patent owner sued his licensees, alleging 
breach of contract and infringement by manufacture of the licensed products after breach; the 
owner requested relief in the form of payment of royalties, reassignment of the patent back to 
the inventor, and specific performance of the contracts in general. Id. at 500–02. It appeared 
that infringement was an afterthought for the plaintiff. Id. at 511 (“[T]he bill in this case, as 
we have already fully pointed out, is really not based on threatened infringement but on the 
contracts; and its reference to infringements is inadequate . . . to present a bill . . . .”). 
 34. New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 478 (1912). In New 
Marshall Engine Co., the plaintiff patent owner requested specific performance of an 
agreement to assign an improvement on a patent. Id. at 479. In Wilson v. Sandford, the Court 
had declined jurisdiction when the patent owner sued to establish forfeiture of a license and 
requested an injunction against infringement should the forfeiture be established. 51 U.S. (10 
How.) 99, 101 (1850). Chief Justice Taney wrote, 
Now the dispute in this case does not arise under any act of Congress; nor does 
the decision depend upon the construction of any law in relation to patents. It 
arises out of the contract stated in the bill; and there is no act of Congress 
providing for or regulating contracts of this kind. 
Id. at 101–02. In contrast, in Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., the Court found federal 
jurisdiction when the plaintiff pleaded patent infringement and alleged breach and termination 
of a license in anticipation of the licensee’s defenses to the charge of infringement. 237 U.S. 
479 (1915). Likewise, in The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., the Court found jurisdiction 
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The Court decided these earlier cases before it developed the second, less direct path 
for jurisdiction, what it refers to as “a ‘special and small category’ of cases.”35 
“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily 
raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal 
court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”36 
Unfortunately, no bright-line rule guides a court37—it must determine whether the case 
involves “not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious 
federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”38 
Addressing whether patent-license cases fall into this special and small category, 
the Federal Circuit has held that “issues of inventorship, infringement, validity and 
enforceability present sufficiently substantial questions of federal patent law to 
support jurisdiction under § 1338(a).”39 In these cases, some of which are described 
below, the court asks whether the contractual rights and duties disputed in the state 
action implicate one of these substantial patent issues relating to the licensee’s 
privilege to operate without liability under the patent claims. If so, the court holds 
that the case arises under the laws relating to patents. 
                                                                                                                 
 
when “the plaintiff sued upon the patent law, so far as the purport and intent of the bill [was] 
concerned. . . . [I]t charged an infringement of its patent rights in general terms . . . which it 
could have done only by virtue of the statute.” 228 U.S. 22, 24 (1913). The Fair’s patent owner 
sold devices to a distributor with a retail price restriction, and the distributor sold the devices 
to purchasers with notice of the restriction. Id. at 23–24. That same Term, the Supreme Court 
held that resale price restrictions like these are invalid and not enforceable as a matter of patent 
law. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1913) (reasoning that such restrictions are 
“beyond the protection and purpose of the [Patent A]ct”); see also Amelia Smith Rinehart, 
Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 496 
(2010). Conditional sales and license restrictions, however, may be enforceable in both 
contract law and patent law, which raises the jurisdictional question of whether the case arises 
under the patent laws. 
 35. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 
547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)). “[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated 
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without 
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” 
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
 36. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 37. Grable, 545 U.S. at 317. In his concurrence in Grable, Justice Thomas states that 
“[j]urisdictional rules should be clear” and indicates his own preference for the bright-line rule 
in American Well Works (in an opinion from Justice Holmes) where only federal causes of 
action arise under federal law. Id. at 321 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas offers that 
the Smith framework, adopted by Grable, “may not be worth the effort it entails.” Id. In Gunn, 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “In outlining the contours of this slim category, we do not paint 
on a blank canvas. Unfortunately, the canvas looks like one that Jackson Pollock got to first.” 
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 38. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. The Court “has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise 
definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original 
jurisdiction of the district courts.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 
U.S. 1, 8 (1983). 
 39. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 414 F.3d 1358, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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Of the four issues listed, the most obvious of these is infringement, which is the 
basis of the patent cause of action found in 35 U.S.C. § 281.40 For example, the 
Federal Circuit in U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray held that a question of patent 
infringement, when necessary for resolution of a state contract action, raised a 
substantial question of federal patent law sufficient to carry jurisdiction under 
§ 1338(a).41 The breach-of-contract action in U.S. Valves required a determination of 
whether the license covered the products sold by the defendant or whether those 
products fell outside of it.42 This in turn required a determination of which products 
the patent-in-suit covered.43 Interestingly, the court did not need to resolve the 
question of patent law to make the determination of breach (a contractual question); 
rather, the question of what products the license covered related only to the measure 
of damages for the prevailing plaintiff.44 
Likewise, in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit found Federal 
Circuit appellate jurisdiction over a case involving a patent owner’s suit against a 
licensee for failure to pay royalties under a patent license.45 The license involved an 
enhanced royalty provision that required the court to determine whether the licensee 
acquired a new company pursuant to the license terms, whether the new company 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
infringes the patent.”). 
 41. 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Further, in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic 
Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., 
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and Additive Controls 
& Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the Federal Circuit 
confirmed that patent infringement also raises a substantial question of patent law when it is 
an element of a plaintiff’s state tort claim. Cf. ClearPlay, Inc. v. Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364, 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding no jurisdiction over a case involving six various state-law 
counts, because even though it was possible that patent infringement could arise during the 
course of the litigation, no count necessarily required resolution of a patent-law issue). 
 42. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372. 
 43. Id.; see also Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App’x 329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (finding jurisdiction over a contract case where the plaintiff alleging breach would 
have to prove infringement to obtain relief). 
 44. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1374–75; see also Portney v. CIBA Vision Corp., 401 F. 
App’x 526, 528–29 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (retaining jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract action 
where the plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant’s products fell within the scope 
of the patent claims). 
 45. 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) appeal transferred, 178 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(unpublished decision). The Fifth Circuit first held that it, not the Federal Circuit, had 
jurisdiction over the question of whether the district court in that case had federal patent 
jurisdiction, stating: 
We decline to read section 1295 as granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal 
Circuit over issues of the propriety of a district court’s jurisdiction under section 
1338. Such an interpretation conflicts with the inherent principles that a regional 
circuit court can determine its own jurisdiction and supervise the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the district courts within its circuit. 
Id. 
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offered the licensed services prior to the acquisition, and whether the new company 
was immune from suit or had a license to the patents-in-suit.46 The Fifth Circuit held 
that these questions could only be answered by determining a substantial question of 
patent law, namely, whether the services provided fell within the claims of the 
licensed patent.47 
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. presented 
a very similar case: a breach-of-contract action involving a question of whether the 
patent-in-suit covered certain products.48 However, in Metabolite, the question of 
patent infringement (or scope of the license) had been resolved in a previous 
litigation between the parties that would serve as res judicata in the case.49 The 
Federal Circuit refused jurisdiction over the case, holding that the patent owner’s 
breach-of-contract action would “not require resolution of a disputed question of 
patent law central to the disposition of the breach of contract claim.”50 Because the 
patent infringement question had already been determined, it did not need to be 
resolved by the Metabolite court.51 
In addition to questions of infringement, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged 
that questions of invalidity and unenforceability of the patent are also substantial in 
the context of § 1338. For example, in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, 
Inc., the court stated, 
In keeping with our precedent, we treat validity and enforceability the same 
as infringement. We see no reason why our jurisdictional jurisprudence 
should distinguish the first two from the latter. Each of these issues is 
substantial in the federal scheme, for they are essential to the federally 
created property right: one determines whether there is a property right, 
another whether that right is enforceable, and the third what is the scope of 
that right. 
In deciding that the issues of validity and enforceability are substantial 
enough, we also look to the purposes that Congress intended to promote 
by forming this court. In enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, which created this court, Congress made manifest its intent to effect 
“a clear, stable, uniform basis for evaluating matters of patent 
validity/invalidity and infringement/noninfringement,” so as to “render[] 
more predictable the outcome of contemplated litigation, facilitate[] 
effective business planning, and add[] confidence to investment in 
innovative new products and technology.” To achieve those goals, we 
conclude . . . that validity and enforceability represent federal interests of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Id. at 289–90. 
 47. Id. at 291. The Federal Circuit also confers jurisdiction where the patent question in 
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint concerns not hypothetical infringement but simply how 
the claims of the patent-in-suit should be construed. See Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright 
& Jaworski LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“As a determination of patent 
infringement serves as the basis of § 1338 jurisdiction over related state law claims, so does a 
determination of claim scope. After all, claim scope determination is the first step of a patent 
infringement analysis.”). 
 48. 599 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010), appeal transferred, 410 F. App’x 151 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 49. Id. at 1283. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1286. 
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great stake over which, when the other requirements of section 1338(a) are 
satisfied, we should exert our appellate jurisdiction under section 
1295(a)(1) via section 1338(a) jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise would 
undermine Congress’s expectations for this court.52 
What are “the other requirements of section 1338(a)”?53 Presumably, the Federal 
Circuit intended that a question of patent validity or unenforceability could support 
federal patent jurisdiction, but the question must also be necessarily raised, actually 
disputed, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the important 
state-federal balance.54 As with the question of infringement (i.e., the scope of the patent 
to cover licensed products), a question of invalidity or unenforceability gives rise to 
federal patent jurisdiction under § 1338 in the Federal Circuit when the question must 
be answered to establish the contractual rights and duties found in the agreement.55 
The Supreme Court also links “arising-under” jurisdiction (whether federal 
question or patent) with what it refers to as the well-pleaded complaint rule, a coarse 
filter for jurisdiction that aspires to separate federal claims from federal issues.56 The 
Court first formulated the rule in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley:57 
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only 
when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is 
based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the 
plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and 
asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the 
Constitution of the United States.58 
Following Mottley, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that a plaintiff 
cannot establish federal jurisdiction simply by raising or anticipating a federal 
defense—the plaintiff’s complaint must present a federal question on its face.59 By 
corollary, a defendant cannot convert a nonfederal case into a federal one simply 
by asserting a federal defense or counterclaim.60 The plaintiff, as master of his suit, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. 153 F.3d 1318, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (citations omitted), 
overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 53. Id. at 1331. 
 54. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013). 
 55. See Bd. of Regents ex rel. Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 414 F.3d 1358, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 56. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and 
Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (describing the well-pleaded complaint 
rule as an analytical filter to be used as a first step in an “arising under” analysis). 
 57. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
 58. Id. at 152. 
 59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, § 5.2.3, at 294–95. 
 60. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). In 
patent cases, the addition of 28 U.S.C. § 1454 and the amendment to § 1295 abrogates Holmes 
Group in the context of compulsory patent counterclaims. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the 
Legislative History of the America Invents Act (pt. 2), 21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 539, 539–41 (2012); 
see also supra note 19. 
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determines whether his case arises under federal law.61 
In modern cases, the Supreme Court continues to place the arising-under inquiry 
solely within the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint: federal-question jurisdiction 
extends to the two Grable categories,62 and then “only [to] those cases in which a 
well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action 
or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law.”63 This rigidity has been criticized over the years,64 but it 
remains an essential element of federal arising-under jurisdiction of all flavors.65 As 
a result, when a plaintiff does not plead a federal cause of action, courts must 
determine from that plaintiff’s complaint the importance of the federal question to 
the case at hand; courts must further decline jurisdiction over federal questions that 
arise in defense to or in anticipation of the defendant’s defenses or counterclaims.66 
Moreover, when the plaintiff brings a claim for relief supported by multiple theories, 
the claim does not arise under federal law unless the federal question is essential to 
each of the theories presented by the plaintiff in support of her claim for relief.67 
Restating the well-pleaded complaint rule as applied to § 1338(a), the Supreme 
Court instructed that patent defenses raised by a defendant in his answer do not supply 
federal patent jurisdiction to the suit, even if those defenses oblige the court to interpret 
the validity of a patent or to resolve other patent issues.68 In other words, § 1338(a) 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). As Justice Holmes 
explained, 
[T]he party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon 
and therefore does determine whether he will bring a “suit arising under” the 
patent or other law of the United States by his declaration or bill. That question 
cannot depend upon the answer, and accordingly jurisdiction cannot be 
conferred by the defence even when anticipated and replied to in the bill. 
Conversely, when the plaintiff bases his cause of action upon an act of 
Congress jurisdiction cannot be defeated by a plea denying the merits of the 
claim. 
Id. (citation omitted). As one scholar notes, “[I]f a party alleges a federal substantive right in 
good faith, jurisdiction exists no matter how wrong he is on the merits.” Herman L. Trautman, 
Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445, 462 (1954). 
 62. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 
(2005) (describing federal-question jurisdiction as invoked most frequently by plaintiffs who 
plead a cause of action created by federal law and less frequently by those who plead “state-law 
claims that implicate significant federal issues”). 
 63. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983). 
 64. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why 
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 
38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 
53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953). 
 65. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4 (reaffirming the rule despite describing it as based 
more on “history than logic”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, § 5.2.3, at 301. 
 66.  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9–11. 
 67. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988). In 
Christianson, the court distinguished between theories and claims, allowing jurisdiction only 
if the claim is based solely on theories involving questions of federal law. 
 68. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). Justice 
Holmes wrote, “A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action. The fact that the 
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requires that the plaintiff’s cause of action carry the substantial patent question 
necessary for federal jurisdiction and for Federal Circuit appellate review.69 
Two relatively modern cases further explain the operation of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule in patent cases, both addressing the rule indirectly through the 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.70 In Christianson, the plaintiff 
alleged federal antitrust liability and state trade-secret theft giving rise to tortious 
interference with business relations, where the state claim required proof that the 
defendant’s patent-law accusations were false.71 The court held that the case did not 
arise under the patent laws because patent law was not an essential element of each 
of the plaintiff’s multiple theories for relief in his case.72 
Similarly, in Holmes Group, the declaratory plaintiff brought a claim for a 
declaration of noninfringement of trade dress under the Lanham Act, and the 
declaratory defendant (a patent owner) counterclaimed for patent infringement 
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 281.73 The Court held that the well-pleaded complaint rule 
                                                                                                                 
 
justification may involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no more material to the 
question under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of contract.” Id. 
Coincidentally (or perhaps not), Justice Holmes wrote the opinions in American Well Works 
(denying jurisdiction over business tort), The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 
25 (1913) (recognizing that a defendant may not force a case to come within federal patent 
jurisdiction), and Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915) (granting jurisdiction 
where patent owner claimed patent infringement). 
 69. See Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260. In American Well Works, the plaintiff brought 
a state suit for libel and injury to its business, claiming that the patent owner falsely and 
maliciously accused it of infringing its patents. The defendant removed the case to federal 
court, alleging that the patent laws gave the case federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff 
would have to prove that he was not infringing the patent in order to establish his state law 
claim of libel. The Court disagreed that federal jurisdiction existed, holding that “[a] suit for 
damages to business caused by a threat to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the 
patent law.” Id. at 259. 
 70. The Federal Circuit receives exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases from 
28 U.S.C. § 1295. See infra Part I.B. 
 71. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 800. Because the district court established federal 
jurisdiction through diversity and the Sherman Act, the Federal Circuit initially refused to hear 
the appeal due to a lack of § 1338 jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Seventh Circuit. 
See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing 
an unpublished Federal Circuit order), vacated, 486 U.S. 800. The Seventh Circuit, in turn, 
transferred the case back to the Federal Circuit. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
798 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit then agreed to weigh in on the merits in 
the “interest of justice.” Christianson, 822 F.2d at 1559–60. The Supreme Court later vacated 
this Federal Circuit decision. Christianson, 486 U.S. 800. 
 72. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 812–13 (distinguishing between a patent theory and a patent 
claim and holding that only patent claims give rise to federal jurisdiction under § 1338). For 
an analysis of how the Federal Circuit interprets federal-state and federal-federal cause-of-
action conflicts, see John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries 
Operating Corp.: The Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit 
Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1899–901 (1996). 
 73. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). For a 
discussion of Holmes Group and its impact on Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction, see 
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. 
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prevented the case from arising under the patent laws because the patent counterclaim 
was not part of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.74 As a result, the well-pleaded 
complaint rule blocks federal patent jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff does 
not facially plead an essential question of patent law—either a federal patent cause of 
action or a cause of action that raises a necessary, substantial, disputed, and important 
federal patent question—as part of her case or controversy.75 
One final rule applies when a party (usually an alleged infringer or licensee) opts to 
file a suit against the patent owner to request anticipatory declaratory relief. Because 
the mechanism for doing so does not confer federal jurisdiction,76 the declaratory 
plaintiff must demonstrate that § 1338(a) confers federal patent jurisdiction. 
Because either party to a controversy may request declaratory relief, declaratory 
cases typically fall into two categories: (1) cases in which the plaintiff could bring 
her own coercive action (referred to here as alternative-relief cases), and (2) cases in 
which the plaintiff has no coercive action of her own (referred to here as 
mirror-image cases).77 In the former category, the plaintiff could bring her own 
coercive action, but she seeks declaratory relief in addition to or instead of the 
coercive relief she has the right to seek.78 For example, a patent owner may file suit 
for patent infringement against an alleged infringer and include claims requesting 
a declaratory judgment that the patent is infringed. The court may decline to award 
damages or an injunction and yet still grant the declaration, which the patent owner 
may use in the future as res judicata against the alleged infringer.79 A patent owner 
may even choose solely to request declaratory relief from the court.80 
In the latter category of declaratory cases, mirror-image cases, the declaratory 
plaintiff has no cause of action or legal right to coercive relief of her own.81 For 
example, an alleged patent infringer may file suit against the patent owner, requesting 
                                                                                                                 
 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012) (granting 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over an appeal from a final decision “in any civil 
action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory 
counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents”). 
 74. Holmes Grp., 535 U.S. at 832–34; see also Cotropia, supra note 56, at 16–17. 
 75. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
 76. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 138 (2007) (“[T]his Court 
has held that ‘the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.’” (quoting 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937))). 
 77. See EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, at xi (2d ed. 1941). 
 78. The Declaratory Judgments Act expressly authorizes a plaintiff with a right to 
coercive relief to request declaratory relief without joining a claim for coercive relief. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
 79. Declaratory judgments granted under § 2201 are considered final judgments and have 
the same preclusive effect as corresponding coercive judgments. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4446 (2d 
ed. 2002) (“The very purpose of this remedy is to establish a binding adjudication that enables 
the parties to enjoy the benefits of reliance and repose secured by res judicata.”). 
 80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
 81. These cases had no remedy in federal courts prior to passage of the Declaratory 
Judgments Act in 1934. BORCHARD, supra note 77, at 806. Indeed, the Act itself sprang from 
recognition of the social and economic advantages in making relief available to these plaintiffs 
despite the lack of any cognizable wrong in law or equity. See id. at 804–05. 
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only declaratory relief in the form of a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. The 
alleged infringer has no affirmative right of her own to cancel the patent by bringing a 
coercive action against the patent owner or the government.82 
In both types of declaratory cases, a declaratory plaintiff embroiled in an otherwise 
justiciable controversy may have difficulty establishing federal patent jurisdiction under 
the well-pleaded complaint rule. In mirror-image cases, a declaratory plaintiff may plead 
anticipatory federal patent defenses to her adversary’s coercive cause of action (which 
may not be a federal patent question).83 In alternative-relief cases, a declaratory plaintiff 
without her own patent cause of action may plead patent questions in anticipation of her 
adversary’s defenses or counterclaims. When considering the application of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule to declaratory patent cases, the Supreme Court has had to 
reconcile the anticipatory character of the declaratory proceeding with the formalistic 
well-pleaded complaint rule, which forbids anticipatory patent pleading (a difficult 
reconciliation, to be sure).84 
Federal patent jurisdiction, even in declaratory cases, turns on whether the 
declaratory plaintiff’s complaint, on its face, presents a federal patent question 
“unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is 
thought the defendant may interpose.”85 The Declaratory Judgments Act’s allowance 
for relief “necessary or proper” against the adverse party necessitates a request for 
the “present declaration of [a] right or immunity,” not something to hold in one’s 
pocket for potential use in later judicial proceedings (i.e., the prohibited hypothetical 
case).86 How does a court determine whether a declaratory plaintiff has raised a 
federal patent question? The Supreme Court emphasizes the impropriety of a 
declaratory plaintiff seeking to establish a federal defense against a coercive state 
cause of action that the declaratory defendant might bring in the future.87 The 
character of the threatened action (the cause of action that the declaratory plaintiff 
anticipates from the declaratory defendant) must be the touchstone for federal 
jurisdiction in declaratory cases, not the character of the declaratory plaintiff’s 
anticipated defense.88 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871) (“It would seriously impair the value of 
the title which the government grants after regular proceedings before officers appointed for 
the purpose, if the validity of the instrument by which the grant is made, can be impeached by 
any one whose interest may be affected by it, and would tend to discredit the authority of the 
government in such matters.”); see also United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 
(1897) (limiting government invalidity challenges to cases of fraud or deceit); Enka B. V. v. 
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 519 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Del. 1981) (saying that the 
“admirable” policies supporting the Act “do not, however, constitute the courts as roving 
inquirers into patent validity”). More recently, the government has been allowed to challenge 
patents on antitrust grounds. See United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973). 
 83. BORCHARD, supra note 77, at 804–05. 
 84. See Frank M. Gilliland, Jr., Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts 
and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 830–32 (1951). 
 85. Id. at 834 (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950)). 
 86.  See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 245 (1952). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 248 (“If the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, 
does not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain 
an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious even 
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Most recently, the Court in Medtronic reiterated that the proper jurisdictional 
inquiry in patent declaratory judgment cases with respect to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule relates to “the nature of the threatened action in the absence of the 
declaratory judgment suit.”89 The Medtronic licensee believed that it owed no 
royalties because its products did not infringe the licensed patent.90 According to the 
Court, if the licensee had acted on that belief, the patent owner could terminate the 
license and bring an action for patent infringement in federal court.91 As such, the 
Court wrote, “this declaratory judgment action, which avoids that threatened action, 
also ‘arises under’ federal patent law.”92 
In sum, a case arises under the patent laws when a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint 
claims a patent cause of action or when other nonpatent claims raise a necessary, 
disputed, and substantial patent question whose resolution in federal court does not 
disrupt the proper federal-state balance.93 There is no exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
questions arising under the patent laws, only over cases arising under the patent laws.94 
Some cases involving patent questions that do not qualify as patent cases may find their 
way to federal courts sitting in diversity, but the Federal Circuit will not have appellate 
jurisdiction over these appeals.95 Other cases involving patent questions may remain in 
state courts, which is not without precedent.96 
                                                                                                                 
 
though the declaratory complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in 
the nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action.”). Justice Reed, concurring in the 
judgment, argued that the controversy was “clear and definite,” but he would have declined 
jurisdiction as a matter of discretion. Id. at 250–251 (Reed, J., concurring). Because the 
Declaratory Judgment Act “exists as an instrument to protect the citizen against the dangers 
and damages that may result from his erroneous belief as to his rights under state or federal 
law,” courts seeking to provide this relatively new alternative form of relief should “appraise 
the threatened injuries to complainant, the necessity and danger of his acting at his peril 
through incurring heavy damages, [and] the adequacy of state or other remedies.” Id. In 
Wycoff, Justice Reed identified no unusual danger of loss or damage. Justice Douglas, dissenting, 
argued that the declaratory plaintiff had both a justiciable controversy and federal-question 
jurisdiction under § 1331 on the facts. Douglas criticized the majority’s failure to exercise 
jurisdiction as “relegat[ing] the declaratory judgment to a low estate.” Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 
(2014); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 (1983). 
 89. Medtronic, 134 S. Ct. at 848. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 
(2005) (“[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, 
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”). 
 94. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988). 
 95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 96. Historically, state courts have determined questions involving the scope, validity, or 
infringement of a patent when such determinations are necessary to decide the case before 
them. See Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 
appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1975); Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. 
Co., 430 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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B. Federal Circuit Appellate Jurisdiction 
In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit and gave it appellate jurisdiction 
over patent-case appeals from the district courts and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).97 The Federal Circuit initially obtained exclusive 
jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . if the 
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this 
title.”98 Therefore, the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit also required 
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule, as underscored by the Holmes Group 
case.99 Any case brought in federal district court under § 1338 gave rise to appellate 
jurisdiction within the Federal Circuit.100 In cases like Christianson and Holmes 
Group, the jurisdictional question surrounding application of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule was one and the same with those relevant to a § 1338 analysis.101 
In 2011, Congress amended § 1295 to remove the direct reference to § 1338, 
replacing it with a grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “an appeal from a 
final decision of a district court . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil 
action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any 
Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.”102 This amendment 
was intended to abrogate Holmes Group by allowing for appellate jurisdiction when 
a defendant’s counterclaim carries the federal patent question, rather than looking 
solely to the plaintiff’s complaint.103 
C. Removal of State Patent Cases to Federal Court 
A case originally filed in state court can be removed to federal court if the case 
could have been brought in federal court to begin with.104 Until 2011, patent cases 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)). 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
 99. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) 
(rejecting § 1295 and § 1338 jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim for patent 
infringement pleaded by the defendant); see supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 70–75. 
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(1) (2012).  
 103. The 2011 amendments not only extend jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over civil 
actions in which compulsory counterclaims arise under the patent laws but also provide for 
removal by any party who brings a claim arising under the patent laws. See AIA, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.); S. 23, 112th Cong. § 17 (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 109–407, at 5 (2006); Matal, supra 
note 60, at 539–41. Note, the new language mimics that of § 1338 purposefully—suggesting that 
“the principles of the well-pleaded complaint that determine the district court’s jurisdiction also 
determine appellate jurisdiction.” Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 968–69 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 n.2 (1988)). 
 104. See 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (2012); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 
463 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1982) (holding that case was not within the removal jurisdiction of § 1441 
because it did not fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts); see also Uroplasty, 
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filed in state court could be removed to federal court only through the general 
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).105 Section 1441(a) allows for removal by a 
defendant of “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of 
the United States have original jurisdiction.”106 This provision does not alter the 
arising-under jurisprudence governing whether the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction over the civil action that the defendant seeks to remove.107 
The state plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint must meet the Grable two-category test 
by presenting either a federal claim for relief or a state claim for relief that raises a 
necessarily raised, actually disputed, and substantial issue whose resolution in federal 
court would not disrupt the federal-state balance struck by Congress.108 To be 
removed to federal court with a right of appeal to the Federal Circuit, the federal 
issue or claim for relief must necessarily be one arising under the laws relating to 
patents in accordance with § 1338.109 
The AIA added a new patent-specific removal section to enable its reversal of 
Holmes Group.110 The new statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1454, governs removal in all cases 
arising under the patent laws.111 In contrast to § 1441, patent litigants on either side 
of the case (“any party”) are given the opportunity to remove the case to federal court 
based on any claims or counterclaims that relate to patent laws.112 In the few cases 
that have ruled on this provision since its enactment, the courts have held, in dicta, 
that the provision also would be subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule, albeit 
applied in a manner consistent with allowing either party’s claims for relief to 
support removal.113 
II. TRAVELING THE DARK CORRIDOR OF PATENT JURISDICTION 
When a patent owner enters into a license agreement, the resulting agreement 
represents an arm’s-length negotiation between the patent owner and his licensee, 
complete with rights and duties enforceable through contract law. The license 
agreement also grants permission to the licensee to practice the patented invention, 
                                                                                                                 
 
Inc. v. Advanced Uroscience, Inc., 239 F.3d 1277, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A case may only be 
removed from state to federal court if it originally could have been brought in federal court.”). 
 105. In 2011, Congress added a new removal statute applicable to patent cases, transferring 
patent removals from § 1441 to new § 1454. See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(c), 125 Stat. 
284, 332 (2011); Univ. of Ky. Research Found., Inc. v. Niadyne, Inc., Civ. No. 13–16–GFVT, 
2013 WL 5943921, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing legislative changes made by the 
AIA with respect to patent-case removal). 
 106.  28 U.S.C. §1441(a). 
 107. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987). 
 108. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005). 
 109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
 110. See supra note 103. 
 111. 28 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (2012). 
 112. Id. 
 113. The cases applying § 1454 have not ruled on the question of patent claims but on the 
question of timely filing for removal. See, e.g., Univ. of Ky. Research Found., Inc. v. Niadyne, 
Inc., Civ. No. 13–16–GFVT, 2013 WL 5943921, at *6, *10 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2013) (holding 
that the state-court defendant did not timely remove the action to federal court in accordance 
with procedural rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1446). 
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a privilege nullifying the patent owner’s right to exclude others. If a dispute arises 
between the parties, the patent owner may sue the licensee for relief in contract or 
patent law.114 If the patent owner decides to pursue only his contract claims, the 
licensee may raise an affirmative defense of patent noninfringement or invalidity, 
occasionally in the form of a counterclaim for declaratory relief. The licensee also can 
sue the patent owner for relief in contract law and can bring his own declaratory action 
in patent law. Accordingly, the universe of cases that might arise looks like this: 
(1) The patent owner sues the licensee for patent relief in federal court. 
(2) The licensee sues the patent owner for declaratory relief in federal 
court. 
(3) The patent owner sues the licensee for contract relief in federal court 
and the parties are diverse. 
(4) The patent owner sues the licensee (or the licensee sues the patent 
owner) for contract relief in state court.
In category one, the case arises under the laws relating to patents. Because the 
cause of action concerns patent law, proper jurisdiction lies in federal court with a 
right of appeal to the Federal Circuit.115 In category two, the Supreme Court has 
effectively determined that the case arises under the patent laws (at least when the 
license has a termination clause for nonpayment of royalties).116 In category three, 
the question of arising-under jurisdiction governs whether the case is appealed to the 
Federal Circuit or a regional appellate court.117 In category four, the question of 
arising-under jurisdiction governs whether the case can be removed to federal court 
and then appealed to the Federal Circuit.118 Categories three and four (both involving 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. Chisum, supra note 10, at 646; see also 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 21.02[1][a][v] 
(2014) (describing the patent owner’s decision as a “Pleader’s Choice”). This does not 
preclude supplemental claims sounding in contract law, which the patent owner may be able 
to bring based on the particular details of the license at issue. See, e.g, Sims v. W. Steel Co., 
403 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Utah 1975) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction over a state contract 
claim based upon a substantial federal patent-infringement claim derived from the same 
operative facts), rev’d on other grounds, 551 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 115. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988); 
Kunkel v. Topmaster Int’l, Inc., 906 F.2d 693, 695–96 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (granting jurisdiction 
over a suit where the patent owner alleged infringement without authority and requested 
remedies under 35 U.S.C. § 284, because “[t]hat is all [the patent owner] needed to do to 
invoke federal jurisdiction”). 
 116. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014). 
 117. See, for example, Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., where the Federal Circuit noted that 
“‘[a]lthough this case arises from a contract claim, rather than directly as a patent infringement 
claim, Jang’s right to relief on the contract claim as asserted in the complaint depends on an issue 
of federal patent law . . . .’ Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn alters that 
conclusion.” 767 F.3d 1334, 1336 (2014) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 118. See, e.g., Uroplasty, Inc. v. Advanced Uroscience, Inc., 239 F.3d 1277, 1279 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (applying § 1441 for removal jurisdiction). As described above, the AIA added 
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state-law claims for relief) pose the same question: because the cause of action is not 
grounded in patent law, does the case fit into the small category of cases defined by 
the Grable two-part test, raising an issue of patent law that is necessary, in dispute, 
substantial, and resolvable in federal court without disrupting the federal-state 
balance approved by Congress?119 
As described in Part I, post-Christianson and post-Grable, the Federal Circuit has 
approached its jurisdiction (and all patent arising-under jurisdiction) over license 
cases in these state-claim categories with some degree of formalism—does the case 
at hand raise a question of infringement, inventorship, invalidity, or 
unenforceability?120 The question of infringement arises in license cases if the license 
ties contractual rights and duties to only those products or services that would 
otherwise infringe the patent or if the claims of the patent require interpretation in 
order to determine the rights and duties under the contract.121 The questions of 
invalidity and unenforceability arise if the license ties contractual rights and duties 
only to those patents that are valid or neither invalidated nor declared unenforceable 
prior to the termination of the license.122 By taking jurisdiction over these four patent 
issues that can arise in state suits, the Federal Circuit has concluded that the need for 
uniformity in patent law justifies elevating some state claims to the federal courts 
and to its own appellate jurisdiction.123 Despite this laudable attempt to craft a 
well-defined rule for federal patent jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit’s approach appears 
to conflict directly with the Supreme Court’s recent analysis in Gunn, resulting in 
several problems: (1) inconsistency among the various courts considering these issues; 
(2) inefficiency produced by each court’s obligation to satisfy itself of its own 
jurisdiction, which increases the litigation time and expense for both litigants and 
courts; and (3) uncertainty following Gunn. Each problem will be addressed in turn. 
A. Inconsistency Among Courts 
The complex layers of rules for determining whether a case arises under the laws 
relating to patents (including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gunn) leave 
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 1454 to allow either party to remove the case to federal court based on any claims or 
counterclaims that relate to the patent laws. See Part I.C, supra. 
 119. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013). 
 120. Since Gunn, which took a narrow view of what cases arise under the laws of patents 
in accordance with § 1338, the Federal Circuit has not reviewed a patent-license case with a 
jurisdictional question. 
 121. See, e.g., Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App’x 329, 331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 122. See, e.g., Natec, Inc. v. Deter Co., 28 F.3d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1994) (transferring an appeal 
to the Federal Circuit after determining that the plaintiff’s state contract claim required a 
determination of whether his license was enforceable after the patent expired). The question of 
inventorship often arises over ownership disputes; such disputes are not the focus of this Article. 
 123. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1330–31 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Hunter Douglas, the Federal Circuit stated that in order to 
achieve Congress’s goals of clarity, stability, and uniformity on questions of invalidity and 
infringement, it must exert jurisdiction over cases involving patent validity and enforceability 
because they “represent federal interests of great stake.” Id. at 1331. 
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litigants vulnerable to inconsistent rulings from the various courts making jurisdictional 
decisions. As discussed in Part I, the Federal Circuit has developed a formal heuristic 
for making the determination—asking whether the state claim at issue involves a patent 
question of infringement, inventorship, invalidity, or unenforceability. However, the 
Federal Circuit need only apply its own heuristic when it assures itself of its own 
jurisdiction over the case; other courts are free to develop their own rules to assure 
themselves of their own jurisdiction over license cases.124 
Even before Gunn called into question the Federal Circuit’s rule of thumb, other 
courts hearing similar disputes decided the jurisdictional question in different ways. 
In U.S. Valves, the Federal Circuit held that an accounting for which products the 
patent claims covered—a question of infringement—caused the case to arise under 
the patent laws.125 In contrast, in Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC, a California 
state court of appeals heard a license case involving a determination of both claim 
scope and validity, keeping jurisdiction in its own state court.126 As in U.S. Valves, 
the Applera patent owner filed a breach-of-contract suit against its licensee, alleging 
that the licensee did not pay royalties or supply mandatory royalty reports as required 
by the license agreement.127 The Applera agreement required the licensee to pay 
royalties on products identified by certain patented processes and features.128 The 
defendant-licensee challenged the state court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the patent 
owner’s contract claim required a resolution of substantial questions of patent law 
(i.e., determining whether the products sold were licensed products and whether the 
underlying patents were invalid).129 Considering Christianson, the California court 
held that neither of these potential patent issues supported federal patent jurisdiction 
because the patent owner was required to prove neither for his breach-of-contract 
claim.130 According to the patent owner’s complaint, the court reasoned, the breach 
might merely involve a “failure to pay royalties concurrently with the submission of 
a royalty report in which defendant acknowledges the sale of products covered by 
the license.”131 The court continued, 
“[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule . . . focuses on claims, not theories, 
and just because an element that is essential to a particular theory might 
be governed by federal patent law does not mean that the entire . . . claim 
‘arises under’ patent law.” Although it is true patent law issues 
conceivably could still arise in such an action—the parties might 
disagree as to the categorization of certain products—relief would not 
necessarily depend on the resolution of such issues.132 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“This court has 
inherent jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” (citing United States v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947))). 
 125. 212 F.3d at 1372. 
 126. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 127. Id. at 186. 
 128. Id. at 189. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 191. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 191–92 (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) 
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Turning to the second potential patent issue, patent invalidity, the California court 
rightfully noted that a licensee could raise patent invalidity as an affirmative defense 
to an allegation of nonpayment of royalties, but the court also observed that a patent 
invalidity question cannot create federal jurisdiction in this context.133 The particular 
agreement at issue required royalty payments for products covered by a “Valid 
Claim,” defined as “the claim of a patent or pending patent application which has not 
been held invalid or otherwise unenforceable by a court from which no appeal has or 
can be taken, or has not otherwise finally been held unpatentable by the appropriate 
administrative agency.”134 According to the court, this contractual language provided 
only the opportunity for the licensee to “plead and prove patent invalidity as a 
defense.”135 The court reasoned that a patent’s presumption of validity sets the 
bargaining table for the licensee and the patent owner alike; it read the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins to “endorse[] challenges to patent validity by 
licensees” but also concluded that state contract law “does not require a licensor to 
prove patent validity as an element of a claim for licensing royalties in the first 
instance.”136 In fact, the Applera court explicitly rejected the reasoning of U.S. 
Valves.137 These types of inconsistent decisions are troubling for litigants, because 
they invite forum shopping by the patent owner eager to remain in state court to 
protect the validity of his patent. The licensee may file a declaratory action in a 
federal court of his choosing, but this adds considerably to the expense of litigating 
the patent’s validity and may result in inconsistent verdicts between the federal court 
hearing the patent case and the state court hearing the contract one. 
B. Inefficiency for Litigants and Courts 
In addition to inconsistency among courts, the current framework also demonstrates 
procedural inefficiencies. Christianson, the most cited § 1338 case decided by the 
Supreme Court, provides an excellent example.138 The case originated as a federal 
antitrust claim filed by a former employee of the patent owner in federal court under the 
general federal-question statute.139 The patent owner appealed to the Federal Circuit, 
which, after full briefing and argument, concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction and issued an unpublished order transferring the appeal to 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit, 
however, raising the jurisdictional issue sua sponte, concluded that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 811 (1988)). 
 133. Id. at 192. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675–76 (1969). Note, Medtronic calls 
into question the reasoning in Applera vis-à-vis the presumption of validity, but there the Court 
focuses on the specific terms of the license agreement. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family 
Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014) (“The patent licensing agreement specifies that, if 
Medtronic stops paying royalties, Mirowski can terminate the contract and bring an ordinary 
patent infringement action.”). 
 137. See Applera, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 190–92. 
 138. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
 139. Id. at 804. 
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Federal Circuit was “clearly wrong” and transferred the case back. The 
Federal Circuit, for its part, adhered to its prior jurisdictional ruling, 
concluding that the Seventh Circuit exhibited “a monumental 
misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction granted this court,” and was 
“clearly wrong.” Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit proceeded to address 
the merits in the “interest of justice,” and reversed the District Court. We 
granted certiorari, and now vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit.140 
Such transfers between appellate circuits can be common. For example, in Jim 
Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded “albeit 
reluctantly, that neither the district court nor this court has jurisdiction over the 
[contract] causes of action pled by plaintiffs.”141 Jim Arnold originated as a case filed 
by a patent assignee in state court for a number of contract-related claims and a claim 
of patent infringement based upon rescission of his assignment agreement to the 
defendants.142 The defendants removed the case to federal court, where they received 
summary judgment on the merits, and the patent assignee appealed to the Fifth 
Circuit.143 The Fifth Circuit transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit, which held 
that jurisdiction was lacking under § 1338(a), but in so doing described its reluctance: 
[J]udicial economy would suggest that plaintiff has had his day in court 
with regard to an initial determination of his claims at the trial level, and 
that the correctness of that determination is now a matter of appellate 
review of its merits. . . . [T]hough the result of a trial in state court may 
replicate the result reached by the federal district court, considerations of 
judicial economy cannot trump a clear rule of law, particularly one that 
goes to the very power of the court to decide the case.144 
Similarly, U.S. Valves originated as a state contract claim filed by the patent 
owner in federal court through diversity of the parties.145 The licensee lost the 
contract case in an Indiana federal district court and appealed to the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit transferred the case to the Federal Circuit after 
concluding that one element of the contract claim—whether the defendant breached 
the contract—could only be resolved by determining whether the patent claims 
covered the products sold by the licensee.146 Because the Federal Circuit had to assure 
itself that jurisdiction was proper, it again assessed the case under the arising-under law 
and determined, again, that the case did arise under the patent laws because patent law 
was a necessary element of the patent owner’s contract claim.147 Because 
subject-matter jurisdiction must be raised by a court (district or appellate) sua sponte if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Id. at 806–07 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 141. 109 F.3d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 142. Id. at 1569–70. 
 143. Id. at 1570–71. 
 144. Id. at 1572. 
 145. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 812–13 (7th Cir. 1999), appeal transferred, 
212 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 146. Id. at 812–15. 
 147. 212 F.3d at 1372. 
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neither party raises the issue, these types of cases are disposed to create multiple 
hearings on the subject of jurisdiction in different courts.148 
C. Uncertainty After Gunn v. Minton 
Separately from disagreements by other courts, the Federal Circuit’s own 
framework now seems uncertain in light of Gunn v. Minton.149 In Gunn, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence of patent arising-under 
jurisdiction in the context of a patent-attorney malpractice claim.150 In the Federal 
Circuit’s patent-malpractice cases, including the oft-cited Air Measurement 
Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.151 and Immunocept, 
LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP,152 the Federal Circuit held that the “case within 
a case” nature of a malpractice claim often dictates substantial underlying questions 
of patent law that confer jurisdiction under § 1338namely, questions of 
infringement, inventorship, invalidity, or unenforceability.153 The legal formalism of 
the Federal Circuit’s arising-under framework—focusing on the specific questions 
presented in the case, not on the surrounding context of a backward-looking 
analysis—was particularly apparent in these malpractice cases.154 
The Gunn Court interpreted the Federal Circuit’s formalism as a departure from 
the more extensive Grable analysis and reversed. The Gunn Court explained, 
[W]e are comfortable concluding that state legal malpractice claims 
based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal 
patent law for purposes of § 1338(a). Although such cases may 
necessarily raise disputed questions of patent law, those cases are by their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1988) 
(Not every case must result “in a perpetual game of jurisdictional ping-pong until this Court 
intervenes to resolve the underlying jurisdictional dispute, or (more likely) until one of the 
parties surrenders to futility. Such a state of affairs would undermine public confidence in our 
judiciary, squander private and public resources, and commit far too much of this Court’s 
calendar to the resolution of fact-specific jurisdictional disputes that lack national 
importance.”); Portney v. CIBA Vision Corp., 401 Fed. App’x 526 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding 
its jurisdiction proper over a suit brought in federal court under the diversity statute after the 
Ninth Circuit transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit). 
 149. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 150. Id. at 1063, 1066, 1068. 
 151. 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 152. 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 153. Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP, 676 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (malpractice claim required the court to define 
the scope of the patent claims, supporting jurisdiction under § 1338); Air Measurement Techs., 
504 F.3d at 1268–69 (malpractice claim required the court to decide hypothetical patent 
infringement “case within the case,” supporting jurisdiction under § 1338). 
 154. See supra note 153; see also John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 
AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003) (recounting a recent trend in the Federal Circuit towards formalism 
and discussing implications for several areas of patent policy). 
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nature unlikely to have the sort of significance for the federal system 
necessary to establish jurisdiction.155 
Accordingly, the final determination of the Grable test requires that the patent 
question be significant to the federal system as a whole, not just to the “particular 
parties in the immediate suit.”156 Such “‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ effects 
are not sufficient to establish arising under jurisdiction.”157 
Following Gunn, at least one appellate court applied this stringent and limited 
view of arising-under patent jurisdiction to a license case. The Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. held that a 
contract case did not arise under the patent laws even when the plaintiff had to prove 
patent infringement to succeed on his breach-of-contract claim.158 According to the 
court, the question of patent infringement was necessarily raised and actually 
disputed, but it was not substantial, and granting patent jurisdiction to the case would 
upset the “congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.”159 As discussed above in Part I, this approach represents a departure 
from pre-Gunn Federal Circuit law, and it remains to be seen whether other appellate 
or state courts will follow suit. 
The Federal Circuit has addressed the Gunn decision only in the context of a state 
tort claim. In Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, 
Inc., the court evaluated its jurisdiction over a case involving claims of tortious false 
statements by the defendant as to whether the patents were infringed or invalid.160 In 
pre-Gunn cases, the Federal Circuit entertained jurisdiction over tort claims 
involving questions of infringement or invalidity because “permitting state courts to 
adjudicate disparagement cases (involving alleged false statements about U.S. patent 
rights) could result in inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts.”161 
The Forrester case, however, presented a different set of facts. The allegedly false 
statements were made about activity that took place in Taiwan, activity that could 
not infringe U.S. patents.162 Moreover, the court referred to the necessary 
construction of the claims of the patent (as a matter of law) as “‘fact-bound and 
situation-specific’ . . . [and] not sufficient to establish federal arising under 
jurisdiction.”163 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that these questions were “not 
‘substantial in the relevant sense,’” under Gunn’s formulation, to arise under the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. 133 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 156. Id. at 1066. 
 157. Id. at 1068 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 
701 (2006)). 
 158. 720 F.3d 833, 84142 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 159. Id. at 841 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 
U.S. 308, 314 (2005)). 
 160. 715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 161. Id. at 1334. 
 162. Id. at 1334–35. The patentee’s right to exclude others does not extend to activity 
conducted outside of the United States and its territories. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).  
 163. Forrester Envtl. Servs., 715 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 
1067–68 (2013)). 
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patent laws, even though claim construction—previously sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction under § 1338(a)—was required to resolve the contract claim.164 
So far, this Part has focused on the state contract claim raised by the patent owner 
(either in a state court or in a federal court sitting in diversity), which may arise under 
§ 1338 in its own right, per Grable’s second category for substantial patent questions. 
When a licensee pleads the question of patent invalidity as an affirmative defense, the 
well-pleaded complaint rule should prevent that federal defense from arising under 
Grable’s first category, thereby ensuring the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint dictates 
jurisdiction.165 When a licensee pleads, instead, a counterclaim for a declaratory 
judgment of patent invalidity or noninfringement, the well-pleaded complaint rule 
shifts to an inquiry about the threatened action that the plaintiff could have brought.166 
Although the patent owner (acting as “master” of his suit)167chooses a state court as his 
forum to seek contract relief, declaratory counterclaims pleaded by a licensee in a 
state-court case should have the same result jurisdiction-wise as if the licensee filed the 
declaratory claim in federal court in the first instance. In both scenarios, under the new 
statutory amendments and removal statute, the counterclaim itself would look to the 
relevant threatened coercive action, and the hypothetical patent-infringement action 
(however remote) would carry the day.168 This should ensure that the patent owner 
cannot remain in state court; licensees likely will remove these cases by pleading 
declaratory-judgment counterclaims that would satisfy § 1454’s well-pleaded 
complaint rule.169 Because Congress added § 1454 in 2011, it remains to be seen 
whether this scintilla of certainty will hold true in patent-license cases. 
III. A WELL-LIGHTED PATH FOR FEDERAL LICENSING LAW 
The preceding Parts of this Article describe the complex and confusing legal rules 
governing the questions of federal and appellate jurisdiction in cases that arise under 
the laws relating to patents. These Parts further suggest some problems with the 
current rules, including inconsistency, inefficiency, and uncertainty. In this final Part, 
I offer a broad suggestion for clarifying the existing law to achieve a number of goals, 
including to promote greater uniformity among licensing decisions in federal courts, 
to capitalize on the benefits of a specialized appellate court, and, importantly, to 
simplify unnecessarily complex rules. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. Id. at 1336 (quoting Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066). 
 165. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“[I]t is now settled 
law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even 
if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that 
the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” (emphasis in original)). 
 166. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952) (suggesting that 
district courts must look to the threatened coercive cause of action to determine whether 
federal-question jurisdiction exists over a declaratory plaintiff’s claim). 
 167. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); see also supra note 61. 
 168. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 (2007) (describing the 
licensee’s continued payment of royalties as making an imminent threat of an infringement 
suit “at least remote, if not nonexistent”). 
 169.  28 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012) (allowing for removal of counterclaims with original federal 
jurisdiction). 
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A. Federal Circuit Formalism Revisited 
As may be apparent, a patent-license case brought in state court balances the right 
of the patent owner (as the master of his suit) to choose his preferred forum and to 
litigate any contract claims separately, without exposing the patent to a validity 
challenge in federal court, against the oft-stated public-policy interest in encouraging 
patent challenges generally.170 The balance should be struck in favor of the public 
interest in having these issues resolved in federal court and appealed to the Federal 
Circuit and in having them resolved at minimal cost. 
As Justice Clarence Thomas has stated, “Jurisdictional rules should be clear.”171 
To that end, the Federal Circuit’s long-suffering formalism,172 with a small 
adjustment, works here. Specifically, one way to solve these jurisdictional problems 
in patent-license cases would be to have all of them arise under the patent laws—a 
clear, bright-line rule that removes the inconsistency, inefficiency, and uncertainty 
inherent in the present set of rules. When a patent owner files a state contract action 
against a licensee, alleging breach of the license or raising other contract claims, 
instead of conducting the extensive and expensive analysis under § 1338(a) and 
§ 1295, the state court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction if the patent 
owner’s contract claim involves any patent-law question, including patent 
infringement (and questions involving the scope of the patent’s claims or any 
field-of-use restrictions therein), invalidity, unenforceability, and inventorship. If a 
party attempts to remove the case under § 1454, the federal court to which it is 
removed should accept jurisdiction, again without the extensive and expensive 
analysis described throughout this Article as being required by Supreme Court 
precedent and § 1338(a). Finally, if a state contract case involving any of these same 
embedded patent questions is brought to federal court by diverse parties, the case 
should be appealed to the Federal Circuit as a case arising under the patent laws. This 
would leave in state court only those claims involving a patent license that are truly 
contractual—cases disputing patent ownership (not related to inventorship) and cases 
in which infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability questions have been 
conceded or otherwise previously resolved by the parties. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. This tension and consequential balancing of interests is not unlike the balancing of 
interests considered by the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). 
See also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344–45 (1971) 
(abrogating the mutuality of obligation principle to encourage patent challenges because of 
the patent grant’s tie to the public interest). This tension manifests itself in the recent circuit 
split over the enforceability of no-challenge clauses in patent licenses (clauses whereby the 
licensee agrees to not challenge the validity of the licensed patent). See Dylan Pittman, Note, 
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 171. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 172. See Thomas, supra note 154. 
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How does this neoformalist proposal fit within the current jurisprudence relating 
to patent law arising-under jurisdiction? Courts simply need to recognize that patent 
licenses are engines for innovation; patent licenses create value from patents in ways 
that patent owners cannot without the ability to grant permission to others in 
exchange for rents.173 If courts recognize a patent license as a special kind of contract 
that not only involves contractual rights and obligations but also involves an 
exchange related to the property interest of the patent (the right to exclude others 
from practicing the claimed invention), the difficulty our current system encounters 
trying to unravel what is and what is not a contract claim falls away. If the case 
includes any embedded patent questions, the case is a patent one. Federal courts and 
the Federal Circuit are perfectly well suited to resolve contractual issues 
accompanying the property concerns associated with the patent or patents-in-suit, 
more so than state courts are suited to resolve patent issues accompanying state 
contract claims. If courts value certainty, efficiency, and consistency in jurisdictional 
rules, the optimal solution for patent-license cases must be to have them all arise 
under the patent laws, to have them heard in federal courts, and to have them 
appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
The Federal Circuit’s pre-Gunn cases suggest that this proposal is consistent with 
§ 1338’s arising-under language.174 The questions of infringement and claim 
construction that arise in almost all license cases should elevate these cases to federal 
status on those grounds alone, even if the court adheres to the limited analysis of 
Grable.175 Cases like U.S. Valves, in doubt after Gunn, represent the high watermark 
of patent jurisdiction to which courts should return. The Federal Circuit should 
confer its own appellate jurisdiction over those cases in which the scope of the patent 
is relevant to the contractual case for interpreting the license and determining the 
relief to be granted. 
Even in cases like MDS (Canada), where the only patent question involves claim 
construction of the licensed patent,176 courts should confer federal patent jurisdiction. 
The question of claim construction, and its role in patent litigation, has been heavily 
debated for many years.177 The Federal Circuit has concluded that claim construction 
is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.178 As a result, district-court claim 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 10–14. 
 174. See, e.g., Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App’x 329, 331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Additive Controls 
& Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 175. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–14. 
 176. MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 177. For a recent summary of the debate, see Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530 (2013). Chiang and 
Solum thoughtfully argue that the problem lies not with linguistic indeterminacy, as others 
have suggested, but with judges’ beliefs regarding the policy goals of claim construction itself. 
Id. at 534. 
 178. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1292 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[W]e are not persuaded that discarding de novo review would 
produce a better or more reliable or more accurate or more just determination of patent claim 
scope.” (emphasis in original)), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-1536 (U.S. June 20, 2014). The 
Supreme Court recently granted a petition for certiorari to consider whether claim construction 
should be reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 
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constructions undergo frequent reversals, a fact that has led to empirical and 
theoretical work suggesting optimal approaches to solving the inherent problem of 
the indeterminacy of language.179 Ascertaining the correct approach to claim 
construction, as a question of law or otherwise, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, the debate about claim construction and its role within all patent litigations 
indicates that when interpretation of a license requires claim construction, that dispute 
involves a necessary, actually disputed, substantial, and relevant question of patent law, 
which arises under § 1338(a) and travels on appeal to the Federal Circuit under § 1295. 
Because claim construction is part of an infringement analysis, determining whether 
any given licensed good or service falls within the claims of the patent should likewise 
give rise to jurisdiction in both federal courts and the Federal Circuit. To hold otherwise, 
as the Eleventh Circuit did in MDS (Canada),180 implies that claim construction is a pure 
question of fact, which the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected.181 It would further 
uniformity of claim construction methods to allow patent-license cases into federal court 
and to have the claims construed as a matter of law. 
For questions of invalidity, the obstacle to federal jurisdiction has been whether the 
plaintiff’s cause of action required determination of the validity of the patent-in-suit’s 
claims, in light of the fact that patents are presumed valid by statute.182 Challengers 
overcome this presumption by proving with clear-and-convincing evidence that the 
patent is invalid or unenforceable, in either a contract case or a patent one.183 The 
California Court of Appeals assumed in Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC, that 
the presumption of validity adhering to patents for evidentiary reasons should preclude 
federal patent jurisdiction solely because a patent owner or licensor need not prove, as 
part of his contract case, that the patent is valid.184 It would follow from this reasoning 
that only licenses with terms defining the patent privilege of the license relative to the 
validity of the claims should proceed in federal court. However, this view of invalidity 
as only occasionally elevating a license case to one arising under the patent laws leaves 
much to be desired with respect to consistency, efficiency, and certainty.185 
Further, the modern Supreme Court has steadfastly encouraged challenges to 
patents by licensees. In Lear, Inc. v. Atkins, the Court explicitly promoted federal 
patent policy over state contract policies that prevented licensees from raising the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014) (No. 13-854). When 
a court defines a patent’s claims in a claim-construction order, it sets the legal boundary of the 
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 180. MDS (Canada), 720 F.3d at 841–42. 
 181. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996) (describing claim 
construction as a “mongrel practice”); see also Teva Pharm., 723 F.3d at 1373 (reaffirming 
that claim construction is a matter of law). 
 182. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 183. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2252 (2011). 
 184. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 178, 191–92 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 185. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969). 
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invalidity of a patent as a defense to a state contract claim.186 In Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, the Court recognized the 
importance of having final judgments made by federal courts to invalidate patent 
claims by holding that these judgments carry preclusive effect forward in rem.187 
Thirty years later, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. opened a door to federal court 
that had previously been closed to those post-Lear licensees who lacked 
constitutional justiciability over their declaratory suits in the Federal Circuit when 
challenging patents without terminating, repudiating, or breaching their licenses.188 
Finally, this past Term, the Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 
LLC addressed the remaining question of statutory jurisdiction for licensees in good 
standing in the affirmative, approving of arising-under federal patent jurisdiction for 
those cases by imagining a hypothetical threatened coercive action for patent 
infringement, even when the licensee remains privileged by the license.189 
These developments suggest that the Court approves of having these cases in 
federal court, not for the traditionally proffered reasons—uniformity of patent law, 
the expertise of federal courts compared to state ones, and the like190—but because 
federal patent jurisdiction rewards licensees who put the patent’s validity in issue 
with resolution in rem. The Court’s different take on patent legal-malpractice cases—
where it emphasizes the important state interests at play and the role of federalism in 
navigating this divide191—provides a stark contrast to its preference for jurisdiction 
in patent-license cases.192 When the Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction in patent 
legal-malpractice cases, the “case within the case” involved questions of 
infringement, invalidity, unenforceability, and inventorship, the same four questions 
it identified as critical in any analysis under § 1338(a).193 The Supreme Court, 
however, corrected the Federal Circuit, choosing state law over such backward-looking 
patent questions.194 Importantly, patent-license cases do not implicate the case within 
the case, and they may be treated differently. For pragmatic reasons, it is sound to 
confer jurisdiction over any patent-license claim when the claim, contract or otherwise, 
inherently implicates questions of claim scope and patent invalidity, even if the license 
does not explicitly tie its rights and duties to these questions. 
A myopic focus on explicit license terms (ostensibly taken from Christianson and 
revisited in MedImmune and Medtronic) would approve of federal patent jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. See id. at 670–71. 
 187. See 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
 188. 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007). 
 189. 134 S. Ct. 843, 848–49 (2014) (supporting federal jurisdiction over a purely 
hypothetical, threatened coercive action for infringement). 
 190. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 17–27. Gugliuzza discusses the general assumption 
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 191. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013). 
 192. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130–31. 
 193. See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 
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 194. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064–65. 
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through § 1338(a) only over those state contract cases in which the contract includes a 
term tying the rights and duties under the agreement to only valid patent claims or those 
patent claims that have not been invalidated by a court.195 It follows that the best 
drafting practices (or worst ones) will dictate jurisdictional questions under this rubric. 
Although the Court in Lear held that patent invalidity comprised not a failure of 
consideration for the contract itself but a complete defense to any obligations under the 
contract (including an obligation to pay royalties),196 the validity of the patent always 
will be relevant to whether the licensee has breached his obligations. The licensee will 
carry the burden of proving invalidity by clear-and-convincing evidence, but courts 
could assume, for jurisdictional purposes, that patent-license cases implicate the 
question of invalidity as though it were an element of the plaintiff’s claim. This would 
mean that all license claims would carry this important question of patent law. The ability 
to invalidate a patent in rem in a federal court after it has issued plays an important role 
in the federal patent system.197 Perhaps the time has come to stop referring to invalidity 
as a defense to infringement or breach of license and nothing more.198 
Congressional intent also supports federal patent jurisdiction over all 
patent-license cases implicitly or explicitly raising patent questions of infringement, 
inventorship, invalidity, and unenforceability. As discussed in Part I, Congress 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and § 1295 specifically to abrogate by statute the ruling 
in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., which held that the 
well-pleaded complaint rule prevented a counterclaim of patent infringement from 
conferring federal patent jurisdiction.199 The change to § 1338(a) was not subtle—
“No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act 
of Congress relating to patents”200arguably demonstrating a clear intent to bring 
all of these cases to federal court, leaving no state court with jurisdiction over patent 
questions.201 The amendment also suggests that an otherwise removable state 
contract case could not stay in state court for resolution of the state contract claim 
with its embedded patent issues.202 To avoid this thorny situation of a case without a 
home in any court, federal courts should assume jurisdiction over license cases that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. The license agreement at issue in MedImmune, for example, featured both types of 
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 200. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
 201. See Paul M. Schoenhard, Gaps, Conflicts and Ambiguities in the Federal Courts’ 
Post-AIA Patent Jurisdiction, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2013, at 20, 22 (describing the 
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 202. The “jurisdictional gap” created by § 1338, in combination with the new removal 
statute in § 1454, suggests that such cases, that is, license cases brought in state court on 
contract claims with embedded patent issues, must be removed by either party or dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
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raise any patent issues, in order to realize the clear congressional intent to have all 
patent-related cases in federal courts and appealable to the Federal Circuit.203 
Building on Congress’ intent to treat patent cases differently (for better or worse), 
a more radical proposal would uncouple 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) from § 1331 such that 
arising-under jurisdiction for patent cases would no longer be bound to the Grable 
line of cases. The general federal-question statute in § 1331 was designed to create a 
category of federal cases that is neither too big nor too small and, as Grable teaches, 
that does not disrupt the important balance between federal and state interests.204 
Grable, then, attempts to solve a different problem than the one presented by 
patent-license cases. For patent cases, Congress chose a specialty appeals court and 
granted exclusive and original jurisdiction in the federal district courts.205 Section 
1331, in contrast, grants original, not exclusive, jurisdiction to general federal 
questions, and these cases are appealable to regional, generalist courts of appeals. 
The decision of whether to hear the case in federal court or in state court involves a 
delicate balancing of state and federal interests of a classic federalist vein. Patent 
cases, on the other hand, with exclusivity in federal courts, have always tipped the 
scales in favor of federal courts, especially given Congress’s recent statutory 
amendments allowing for removal of counterclaims despite the well-pleaded 
complaint rule.206 Additionally, uncoupling § 1338(a) from § 1331 and its analysis 
would allow for abandoning the well-pleaded complaint rule in its entirety in patent 
cases. Indeed, when it recognized a purely hypothetical coercive claim of patent 
infringement—even when the license continued to protect the licensee from such an 
action—the Court in Medtronic implicitly looked away from the rigor of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule (or possibly considered it a merits issue, rather than a 
jurisdictional one), ignoring the theories distinction from Christianson and the 
detailed Grable analysis in favor of assuming jurisdiction over the case.207 This 
lesson should not go unheeded in future patent-license cases. 
Finally, a bright-line jurisdictional rule governing patent-license cases will 
promote efficiency in patent cases and uniformity in federal licensing law. The Court 
in MedImmune described the licensee’s claim that its license “[did] not require the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. By superseding Holmes Group to expand removal jurisdiction and arising-under 
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 207. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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payment of royalties because the patents do not cover its products and are invalid” 
as a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one; the contract dispute, with its embedded 
questions of patent law, did not disappear just because the license was still in 
effect.208 Likewise, the patent questions that percolate in state-action cases really are 
merits questions: Is the patent invalid? Would the licensee be infringing but for the 
license? Courts are expending resources to address the jurisdictional questions before 
turning to the merits in a way that does not improve the tension between state and 
federal courts but only adds to confusion over how to apply the vague Grable 
standard.209 As discussed above, Congress clearly has expressed its intent to keep 
these cases in federal courts with rights to appeal to the Federal Circuit, suggesting 
that a streamlined approach to jurisdiction would be welcome.210 
Importantly, the Federal Circuit, by having jurisdiction over these state contract 
cases with embedded patent questions, could further develop its own licensing-law 
jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit has been described as a “specialized contracts 
court,” in the sense that the court handles many contract cases, including many 
patent-license cases.211 In these cases, the Federal Circuit has developed a fair 
amount of its own law of contracts, stating that such law is necessary to promote 
uniformity within the patent system.212 For example, in Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark 
Cards, Inc.,213 the court stated, 
[T]he question of whether an invention is the subject of a commercial 
offer for sale [as required by 35 U.S.C. § 102] is a matter of Federal 
Circuit law, to be analyzed under the law of contracts as generally 
understood. To hold otherwise would potentially mean that a patent 
could be invalid in one state . . . and valid in a second state, when the 
same actions did not amount to an offer under the laws of that second 
state. Such a result is clearly incompatible with a uniform national patent 
system.214 
In fact, one of the main reasons for the formation of the Federal Circuit was to 
promote certainty and to “reduce, if not eliminate, the forum-shopping” by parties to 
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patent litigations.215 Reducing the jurisdictional burden by streamlining the rule will 
push the court forward on this goal. 
B. Disadvantages Considered 
A proposal of the nature described in this Article cannot be fully explored without 
identifying and managing any inherent disadvantages. One significant disadvantage 
to such a rule involves the tension revealed between the parties’ expectation interests 
in the contract and the strong public-policy interest in encouraging patent challenges 
as described in Lear.216 The Federal Circuit implicitly selects the patent-policy 
interests over any state contractual law and private contractual expectations when it 
accepts jurisdiction over not only those cases brought by licensees in good standing 
post-MedImmune and as approved in Medtronic but also those cases brought by a 
patent owner in state court on contract claims with embedded patent questions. 
However, this outcome preserves the Federal Circuit’s power to create a body of 
federal licensing law separate from state contract law and dictated by the Federal 
Circuit’s specialized view of patent law. At the same time, the patent owner loses his 
right to shield a presumptively valid patent from challenges by entering into licenses 
and pursuing any available contractual remedies without resorting to infringement 
litigation, where any invalidity claim would carry preclusive effect. Perhaps the 
interests of the patent owner to choose his forum should carry more weight than they 
have so far in the Supreme Court. However, the Lear, Blonder-Tongue, and 
MedImmune cases may be read to strongly favor patent challenges over the patent 
owner’s choice of state forum and, in fact, over state contract law in general. 
One wonders whether a licensee might prefer to litigate the questions of validity 
as a defense to a license but without the in rem finality of the determination, as that 
helps all licensees, not just the licensee litigating in state court. Again, the choice of 
clear rules to encourage patent challenges may outweigh any costs related to 
removing the patent owner’s ability to bring a state-court action without exposing 
the weaknesses of his patent. A licensee could bring his own declaratory judgment 
action for invalidity or noninfringement, even without repudiating the license. It does 
not follow that the jurisdictional rules should work to prevent him from removing 
such a state action if he does not bring a counterclaim but instead pleads invalidity 
as an affirmative defense or if the contract does not explicitly tie its obligations to 
valid patent claims. Some common sense would go a long way in this area of the law. 
Importantly, this proposal also raises significant questions about the proper 
balance between state and federal courts in hearing cases.217 The Constitution gives 
Congress the power to enact legislation to award exclusive rights to inventors for 
limited times,218 and Congress does so in the patent laws. This Article only intends 
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to describe the complexity of jurisdictional questions that arise out of state contract 
actions with embedded patent questions, and it offers that such cases should follow 
other patent cases into federal courts through § 1338. Decoupling § 1338 from § 1331 
would go further to emphasize the special nature of patent-license cases, and patent 
cases in general, in a manner that leaves intact the important federalism issues raised 
in other types of federal-question cases—and indeed, in other patent-question cases, 
like the malpractice complaint at issue in Gunn.219 
Further, a blanket rule like the one proposed will not reduce the “preeminence of 
the states’ laws” because the Federal Circuit and the district courts hearing these 
patent cases, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, must apply state laws to the 
contractual issues that they end up hearing in conjunction with these patent cases.220 
As such, even though these license cases will be litigated in federal courts and 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, parties will still have the ability to select—via 
contract—the state laws they prefer to govern their transactions. Nevertheless, in 
some areas important to patent law, funneling these cases to the Federal Circuit and 
not leaving the occasional case behind in state court may invite the Federal Circuit 
to develop a federal common law of contracts when necessary to provide the 
uniformity and consistency that its mission requires. 
Along those lines, one recent critic of the Federal Circuit has charged the court 
with ignoring the Erie doctrine while developing a federal common law of contract 
in certain areas of patent law, resulting in a power grab by the Federal Circuit that 
limits innovation and competition.221 Empirically, it may be that innovation and 
competition are reduced by Federal Circuit developments in contract law, but such 
assessments must also take into account the benefits of uniformity and certainty that 
may derive from a common law of contracts developed by the Federal Circuit. In 
fact, the Federal Circuit may be accustomed to developing such a federal common 
law in the context of government contracts for just this reason.222 
Yet one need not be convinced that all patent-license issues at the Federal Circuit 
should be the subject of a separately derived federal common law of contract to 
accept the fairly uncontroversial position that the Federal Circuit, in many of these 
cases, could simply apply state contract law to all of the patent-license claims that it 
hears.223 The contribution of this Article is not to provide an extensive solution to the 
concerns of federalism, jurisdictional power grabbing, or the necessity of uniformity 
in patent law, but to begin a conversation about dismantling these complex rules and 
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expensive jurisdictional inquiries in favor of merits-based determinations in federal 
courts on the licensing issues at stake.224 
CONCLUSION 
 The jurisdictional rules that determine whether a license case arises under the 
patent laws are cumbersome and expensive for courts and litigants alike. Gunn v. 
Minton, a recent patent-malpractice case raising very different concerns than the ones 
raised in license cases, will only add to the inconsistency, inefficiency, and 
uncertainty that surround this “dark corridor” of federal-question jurisdiction. The 
time has come for a new assessment of arising-under jurisdiction in patent cases that 
reduces these burdens, promotes uniformity, encourages patent challenges, and 
reflects Congress’s intent to carry federal patent questions into federal courts. 
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